 |
Benjamin Ho Economics PhD, Stanford University
Download my curriculum vitae (CV) in pdf.
|
Publications:
Focal points in coordinated divergence
with Chip Heath and Jonah BergerJournal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 635-647
Abstract: We explore situations of coordinated divergence, wherein some people coordinate on a shared cultural practice that diverges from the practice of others. Previous literature on individual drives for uniqueness or difference cannot explain coordinated divergence because it leads to a prediction of idiosyncratic differentiation. Using Schelling's original coordination games as a starting point, we provide experimental evidence that people can effectively solve problems of coordinated divergence. We also discuss why coordinated divergence often takes the form of choosing opposites (long hair/short hair, red/blue, etc.).
Working Papers:
Signaling Identity in Social Networks: A Model of Symbolic Consumption
with Jonah BergerMotivated by experimental evidence, we construct a model of how identity shapes preferences. People consume not only physical goods but also social interaction. Consumers therefore have both intrinsic motivations (preferences for consumption) and extrinsic motivations (how choices impact social interaction) for their choices. Theory demonstrates how the distribution of knowledge in a network, the structure of the social network, the visibility of a good, and the distribution of intrinsic preferences all influence the supply and demand of symbolic goods even when such goods are cheap.
Paper available upon request.
Apologies as Signals: With Evidence from a Trust Game
Abstract: Apologies are a previously understudied social institution integral in the maintenance of social relationships. Their application ranges from corporate culture to political systems to legal settings. This paper formulates a game theoretic signaling model using rational agents with two-dimensional type that serves as a framework for understanding apologies and their use. An existence result that extends single-crossing is established. The theory is then tested using a novel variant of the trust game experiment, and used to assess the impact of apologies in medical malpractice litigation.
It was suggested that I post my apology poster made from powerpoint as an example for others who have to prepare a conference poster. It is a bit wordy and the information is out of date, but aesthetically, I am quite happy with it. There was a time in my life, when I thought I would become a graphic designer.
Apologies in Medical Malpractice: Empirical Evidence from a Differences-in-Differences Estimate by State Legislation
Abstract: Legal scholars identify a "vicious cycle" where doctors are trained never to apologize to patients for fear of getting sued, but patients often report that they sued their doctors only because they never received an apology. Legislation in 25 states have made apologies inadmissible in court for civil litigation. Differences in differences estimates find that this potentially policy reduces litigation by over 30% and that the reductions occur in precisely the areas predicted by theory.
Paper available upon request.
Divergence in Cultural Practices: Tastes as Signals of Identity
with Jonah Berger and Chip HeathAbstract: Divergence is pervasive in social life: people select different tastes to distinguish themselves from others, and they abandon tastes when others adopt them. We propose an identity-signaling approach to divergence; people diverge to signal their identity to facilitate social interactions. Tastes gain value through association with groups or types of individuals, but become diluted when members of more than one type hold them. Consequently, different types of people will diverge in the tastes they select, and they will abandon tastes adopted by members of other social types.
Paper available upon request.
Work in Progress:
Paying for Climate Change: How social information and social preferences affect willingness-to-pay
with Antonio BentoA growing literature has consistently found that people care about climate change and that they are willing to pay to mitigate its effects. However, prior studies primarily relied on hypothetical methods, and have ignored at least two important political realities: 1) implementing any policy to address climate change depends not only on individual preferences but also on how those preferences are aggregated in an election; 2) how the policy is structured—e.g. how costs are distributed—affects voter preferences. In this project, we use an incentive-compatible experimental design using carbon offsets to elicit voter preferences over alternative policies to mitigate the effects of climate change, and seek to understand how factors such as fairness, social norms, and social information affect choices.
Email:
bth26@cornell.edu
Phone:
650-867-8270
Personal Home Page:
http://www.benho.org
Last updated on Sept 2008