 |
Benjamin Ho Economics PhD, Stanford University
Download my curriculum vitae (CV) in pdf.
|
Publications:
Focal points in coordinated divergence
with Chip Heath and Jonah BergerJournal of Economic Psychology 27 (2006) 635-647
Abstract: We explore situations of coordinated divergence, wherein some people coordinate on a shared cultural practice that diverges from the practice of others. Previous literature on individual drives for uniqueness or difference cannot explain coordinated divergence because it leads to a prediction of idiosyncratic differentiation. Using Schelling's original coordination games as a starting point, we provide experimental evidence that people can effectively solve problems of coordinated divergence. We also discuss why coordinated divergence often takes the form of choosing opposites (long hair/short hair, red/blue, etc.).
The Transportation Sector: Energy and Infrastructure Use
with Ann WolvertonEconomic Report of the President 2007
Link: Economic Report of the President 2007
Working Papers:
Signaling Identity in Social Networks: A Model of Symbolic Consumption
with Jonah BergerAbstract: Motivated by experimental evidence, we construct a model of how identity shapes preferences. People consume not only physical goods but also social interaction. Consumers therefore have both intrinsic motivations (preferences for consumption) and extrinsic motivations (how choices impact social interaction) for their choices. Theory demonstrates how the distribution of knowledge in a network, the structure of the social network, the visibility of a good, and the distribution of intrinsic preferences all influence the supply and demand of symbolic goods even when such goods are cheap.
Paper available upon request.
Apologies as Signals: With Evidence from a Trust Game
Abstract: Apologies are a previously understudied social institution integral in the maintenance of social relationships. Their application ranges from corporate culture to political systems to legal settings. This paper formulates a game theoretic signaling model using rational agents with two-dimensional type that serves as a framework for understanding apologies and their use. An existence result that extends single-crossing is established. The theory is then tested using a novel variant of the trust game experiment, and used to assess the impact of apologies in medical malpractice litigation.
It was suggested that I post my apology poster made from powerpoint as an example for others who have to prepare a conference poster.
Apologies in Medical Malpractice: Empirical Evidence from a Differences-in-Differences Estimate by State Legislation
with Elaine LiuAbstract: Legal scholars identify a "vicious cycle" where doctors are trained never to apologize to patients for fear of getting sued, but patients often report that they sued their doctors only because they never received an apology. Legislation in 35 states have made apologies inadmissible in court for civil litigation. Differences in differences estimates find that this potentially policy reduces litigation by over 30% and that the reductions occur in precisely the areas predicted by theory.
Paper available upon request.
Divergence in Cultural Practices: Tastes as Signals of Identity
with Jonah Berger and Chip HeathAbstract: Divergence is pervasive in social life: people select different tastes to distinguish themselves from others, and they abandon tastes when others adopt them. We propose an identity-signaling approach to divergence; people diverge to signal their identity to facilitate social interactions. Tastes gain value through association with groups or types of individuals, but become diluted when members of more than one type hold them. Consequently, different types of people will diverge in the tastes they select, and they will abandon tastes adopted by members of other social types.
Paper available upon request.
Ethnic Minority Disadvantages in China’s Labor Market?
(under review)with Reza Hasmath and Elaine Liu
Abstract: Empirical evidence shows that consumers of news care about both the novelty of the news they read, as well as how popular that news topic is with others. We develop a continuous time dynamic model that predicts how news providers invest in covering stories with either high novelty or high popularity, and how this investment depends on the market structure (monopoly, oligopoly, competition). We then seek to test the predictions of the model by examining which stories magazines select for their cover, and how that depends on the novelty and popularity of the topic, by looking at how those stories are covered in daily newspapers. This work has implications on innovation more broadly, specifically novelty and popularity can be thought of as innovation and technology transfer.
Paper available upon request.
Work in Progress:
Paying for Climate Change: How social information and social preferences affect willingness-to-pay
with Antonio Bento and Greg PoeAbstract: There is extensive evidence that people are willing to pay to mitigate climate change, and there is extensive evidence that people have social preferences, and that behavior can be influenced by information about the behaviors of others. We experimentally test the effect of social information on people’s willingness-to-pay for green goods. We vary the framing of this information, and find that information that others are more helpful leads to crowd out, while information that others are more harmful leads to diffusion of responsibility.
A General Equilibrium model of Carbon Offsets under Carbon Cap and Trade
with Antonio BentoAbstract: Estimates suggests that as early as 2012, 15% of carbon reductions under proposed cap and trade legislation could come from carbon offsets generated in non-regulated sectors like agriculture, with the proportion increasing with time. We propose a general equilibrium model that includes the regulated (energy) sector, the unregulated (agriculture) model, and then use the model to estimate the welfare effects of offset regulation, as well as how offsets can be optimally regulated to account for issues such as additionality, leakage, and permanence. The model also estimates the interaction with innovation and social preferences such as altruism.
Novelty and Popularity in Markets for News: Theory and empirics on innovation and transfer in the provision of news
with Peter LiuAbstract: Empirical evidence shows that consumers of news care about both the novelty of the news they read, as well as how popular that news topic is with others. We develop a continuous time dynamic model that predicts how news providers invest in covering stories with either high novelty or high popularity, and how this investment depends on the market structure (monopoly, oligopoly, competition). We then seek to test the predictions of the model by examining which stories magazines select for their cover, and how that depends on the novelty and popularity of the topic, by looking at how those stories are covered in daily newspapers. This work has implications on innovation more broadly, specifically novelty and popularity can be thought of as innovation and technology transfer.
Email:
bth26@cornell.edu
Phone:
650-867-8270
Personal Home Page:
http://www.benho.org
Last updated on Oct 2009